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MEDIA CENSORSHIP AND ACCESS TO TERRORISM
TRIALS: A SOCIAL ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS
DERIGAN SILVER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although censorship, in its most basic form, deals with prior
restraints on the press, because of the judiciary's traditional
antipathy toward prior restraints'-even when national security
information is involved 2-and the ease of dissemination brought
about by the Internet, preventing the media from accessing
information has become an alternative to outright media "cen-
sorship." For example, soon after the Pentagon first dealt with
the dissemination of national security information via
WikiLeaks,3 Defense Secretary Robert Gates tightened media
access to the Pentagon by requiring all department officials to
notify the Department of Defense's Office of Public Affairs prior
to any communication with the news media or the public.' Gates
reminded government employees that revealing unclassified but
"sensitive, pre-decisional or otherwise restricted information" to
the press without approval was prohibited.' Similarly, recent ter-
rorism trials have made the federal courts a battleground for
access to information related to terrorism and a proxy for media
censorship.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly found
there is a First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings
for the press and the public,' the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 gave rise to new access controversies as the government
* Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Department of Media, Film and Journalism
Studies, University of Denver.
1. See, e.g., Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
2. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
3. See Stephanie Strom, Pentagon Sees a Threat from Online Muckrakers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at A10.
4. Memorandum from Robert Gates, Sec'y of Def., to Deputy Sec. of Def.
(July 2, 2010) (on file with author), available at http://www.rcfp.org/news
items/docs/20100910_105806_dod memo_2.pdf (regarding interations with
the media).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Riverside County. Superior Court, 478 U.S.
1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enter. II]; Press-Enter. Co. v. Riverside Cnty. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enter. I]; Globe Newspaper Co. v.
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sought to close judicial proceedings and seal records in cases
with connections to terrorism. The first such controversy began
just ten days after the attacks when Chief Immigration Judge
Michael J. Creppy issued a directive mandating closure of all
"special interest" immigration hearings.' In December, 2001, a
Michigan immigration judge held a closed hearing to decide if
Rabih Haddad, who had overstayed his tourist visa and was sus-
pected of having connections to al-Qaeda, could be deported.
Several media organizations, along with members of Haddad's
family and the public, sued, contending the closed proceeding
was unconstitutional. Both a federal trial court and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the First
Amendment right of access established in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia8 applied, even though the immigration hearings
were not actually court proceedings but administrative, quasi-
judicial proceedings. The courts held that the Creppy directive
requiring blanket closure of all "special interest" hearings was
unconstitutional.' A few months later, however, in a case involv-
ing closed deportation hearings in Newark, New Jersey, the
Third Circuit issued a contradictory decision, ruling 2-1 that
there was no constitutional right of access to such proceedings. o
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal in
the case, thereby failing to resolve the conflict between the two
circuits.''
Five years later, the Court's 2008 ruling that foreign detain-
ees at Guantinamo Bay have the right to challenge their impris-
onment in civilian courts opened the door for more battles over
government secrecy." In more than 100 cases brought as a
result of the ruling, the Justice Department filed unclassified doc-
uments under seal, thereby restricting access to judges, lawyers
and government officials. The secrecy, the government said, was
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
7. E-mail from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge of the U.S., to
all Immigration Judges (Sept. 21, 2001, 12:20 PM) (on file with author), availa-
ble at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy0921
Olmemo.pdf. (regarding cases requiring special procedures). "Special interest"
cases are those in which sensitive or national security information may be
presented, including any information related to terrorist investigations.
8. 448 U.S. at 573.
9. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd,
303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
10. N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
11. N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
12. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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necessary because some unclassified documents mistakenly con-
tained classified information. On June 1, 2009, a federal district
judge ruled the wholesale sealing of unclassified documents vio-
lated the public's First Amendment and common law right of
access to judicial records." "Public interest in Guantinamo Bay
generally and these proceedings specifically has been unwaver-
ing. The public's understanding of the proceedings, however, is
incomplete without the factual returns. Publicly disclosing the
factual returns would enlighten the citizenry and improve per-
ceptions of the proceedings' fairness," Judge Thomas Hogan
wrote." He gave the government until July 29 to make public
the unclassified documents or request continued secrecy for spe-
cific words or lines highlighted in colored marker with an expla-
nation of why the material should be protected.' 5
Unfortunately, these battles have continued well into 2010.
In April, a federal appeals court judge abruptly closed the court-
room just one minute after arguments began in the case of a
Guantdnamo Bay detainee." The move was particularly unset-
tling because the detainee's representative and the Justice
Department had both consented to a public hearing. In May,
the Pentagon barred four reporters from reporting on the mili-
tary commission proceedings at Guantdnamo Bay because they
published articles identifying a witness whose identity had been
protected by the presiding judge, even though the witness's
name had already been released to the public on multiple occa-
sions." Although the Pentagon recently received praise from
news organizations that had protested Guantinamo policies as
unduly restrictive when the Department of Defense (DOD)
revised its rules for reporters covering military trials at Guantd-
namo,' 8 these incidents show that the battles over access and
13. In re GuantAnamo Bay Detainee Litig., 624 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C.
2009).
14. Id. at 37.
15. Id. at 34. See also Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(ordering the government to "specifically explain[] why protected status is
required for the information" it sought to keep secret).
16. See Nadia Tamez-Robledo, D.C. Appeals Court Suddenly Closes Guantd-
namo Detainee Hearing, REPS. COMMITFTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESs (Apr. 5, 2010),
http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=1 1353.
17. SeeJeff Stein, Papers Protest Reporters' Ejection From Guantdnamo, WASH.
POST SPYTALK (May 6, 2010), http://blog.washingtonpost.com/spytalk/2 0 10/
05/papers-protest reporters.eject.html.
t8. See Rosemary Lane, Pentagon Relaxes Reporter Guidelines at Guantdnamo
Bay, REPs. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS, (Sept. 14, 2010, 6:19 PM), http://
www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=11555 (noting that new guidelines
allowed media organizations to use edited photos and videos, narrowed the def-
inition of "protected information," and provided for an appeals process in
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media censorship are far from settled. In addition, they raise
numerous important questions about the balance of power
between the government, the people and the press in the United
States of America.
This Article contends that using the social architecture met-
aphor-which focuses on how the law creates and distributes
power between groups-is particularly well suited to understand-
ing the importance of access to the trials of terrorist suspects.
Specifically, the article argues it is important that the "architec-
ture of power"" created by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases that
have provided for a First Amendment right of access to criminal
trials not be replaced with an architecture that more closely
resembles cases that have dealt with access to national security
information and locations. In these cases, rather than decide
cases by focusing on the societal benefits of open government,
courts have typically focused on the individual facts of each case
without an eye toward the larger social architecture the decisions
create. This article posits that an architecture of presumptive
access that still allows for a case-by-case closure-as opposed to
an architecture of presumptive secrecy with case-by-case disclo-
sure-is consistent with the original architecture of the Constitu-
tion and First Amendment and advances trust in the government
as it fights terrorism.
Part II discusses social architecture theory and the law, with
a focus on how the theory has been applied to cases involving
access to government information. Part III examines the social
architecture of the Supreme Court's rulings in cases that have
established a First Amendment right of access to judicial pro-
ceedings. Part IV describes cases in which courts have consid-
ered a First Amendment right of access to national security
information and locations and the architecture-or lack of archi-
tecture-created by these cases.20 Part V argues that if this archi-
tecture is applied to terrorism trials, it will breed distrust of the
government and its handling of terrorism and undermine the
independence of the judiciary. In addition, it argues that limit-
which organizations could challenge decisions to classify information as "pro-
tected"). See also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., MEDIA GROUND RULES FOR GUANTANAMO
BAY, CUBA (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/d20100910ground
rules.pdf [hereinafter GUANTANAMO MEDIA GROUND RULES].
19. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1087 n.19 (2002) (the term "architecture of
power" refers to a "particular power structure [created] . . . by the law.").
20. Because the Supreme Court has considered so few cases dealing with
access to national security information, this section discusses both Supreme
Court cases and lower court cases dealing with a First Amendment based right
of access.
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ing access to these proceedings is unnecessary because of the
allowance for case-by-case closure and the ability of federal
judges to use the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA),2 1 which is designed to protect national security informa-
tion during federal criminal proceedings. Finally, this Article
contends that through the use of proper public policy, such as
the Pentagon's new guidelines, judicial decisions and statutory
law, such as CIPA, the architecture established by the Constitu-
tion, the First Amendment and the Court's judicial access juris-
prudence can be used to reinforce the public's right to know
about the prosecution of terrorists, advance the press' ability to
report on matters of public concern and strengthen the indepen-
dence of the judiciary.
II. SOCIAL ARCHITECTURE THEORY AND THE LAW
Several authors have used the social architecture metaphor
to "emphasize that legal and social structures are products of
design"" and judicial decisions create architectures of power
that can determine who controls information. Applying the con-
cept to privacy law, Daniel J. Solove, one of the first scholars to
apply the term "social architecture" to refer to the social struc-
tures created by law,2 3 wrote that the metaphor captures how the
law structures social control and freedom in a society.24 just as
the architecture of a building can be designed to determine how
people interact,25 Solove and others suggest that social architec-
ture can be designed by law to determine how groups interact in
society." Legal and computer science scholar Barbara van
Schewick wrote, 'Just as the architecture of a house describes its
basic inner structure, the architecture of a complex system
describes the basic inner structure of the system." The term
"architecture" has been used to describe how computer code can
21. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006).
22. Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerabil-
ity, 54 HASTINGs L.J. 1227, 1239 (2003).
23. Solove credited Lawrence Lessig and Joel R. Reidenberg for the idea
that architecture refers to more than the design of physical spaces. See Solove,
supra note 19, at 1087 n.19; Solove, supra note 22 at 1239.
24. Solove, supra note 22, at 1239.
25. See generally THOMAs A. MARKUS, BUILDINGS AND POWER: FREEDOM AND
CONTROL IN THE ORIGIN OF MODERN BUILDING TYPES (1993) (describing how
architecture can be used to influence social structure); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Architecture as Crime Control, I1I YALE L.J. 1039 (2002) (describing how the way
that neighborhoods and buildings are designed can affect criminal behavior).
26. Solove, supra note 22, at 1239.
27. BARABARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 3
(2010).
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determine whether the Internet is a vehicle for freedom of
expression or an instrument of control," to examine judicial
behavior in a collegial context by exploring how judicial behavior
is impacted by socially prominent and proximate jurists,29 and to
analyze the public policy and technological foundations of tele-
communication and Internet companies and technologies that
promote the dissemination of information by private citizens.o
Recently, social architecture theory has also been applied to
laws governing access to government information,"' congres-
sional deliberations regarding a federal shield law,3 2 and the
power relationships created by cases dealing with national secur-
ity information." Professor Cathy Packer wrote that law is both
the means and the product of a construction process and that
legal analysis that goes beyond discussing individual cases by
examining the architecture they create "brings a much clearer
understanding of the impact of and solutions for a variety of
legal problems." 4 The key idea behind the social architecture
metaphor is that creating an architecture of power is about "the
common good as much as it is about individual rights."" Packer
wrote that when courts discuss the distribution of power between
groups they are actively creating architecture, whether they
acknowledge it or not, in addition to deciding individual cases.
For example, Packer wrote, "[0] ne of the clearest examples of a
court constructing social architecture" is New York Times v. Sulli-
28. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0, at 2 (2006); SCHEWICK, supra
note 27, at 3; Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information
Policy and Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 553-55 (1998); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Rules for the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging Trade and
Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 296 (1999); Timothy Wu, Network
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. t41
(2003).
29. See Daniel M. Katz, Derek K. Stafford, & Eric Provins, Social Architec-
ture, Judicial Peer Effects and the Evolution of the Law: Toward a Positive Theory of
Judicial Social Structure, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 977 (2008).
30. SeeJack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question ofDesign, 76 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 933 (2008).
31. See Cathy Packer, Don't Even Ask! A Two-Level Analysis of Government
Lawsuits Against Citizen and Media Access Requestors, 13 Com m. L. & PoL'v 29
(2008).
32. See Cathy Packer, The Politics of Power A Social Architecture Analysis of the
2005-2008 Federal Shield Law Debate in Congress, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
395 (2009).
33. See Derigan Silver, Power, National Security and Transparency: Judicial
Decision Making and Social Architecture in the Federal Courts, 15 COMm. L. & Pou'v
129 (2010).
34. Packer, supra note 31, at 39.
35. Solove, supra note 19, at 1116.
MEDIA CENSORSHIP AND A CCESS TO 7ERRORISM TRIALS 1
van,3 6 in which "the Court empowered the media to scrutinize
the behavior of government officials by creating a constitutional
defense against libel suits filed by public officials."3 7 According
to Packer, "[T]he social architecture created by Sullivan tipped
the balance of power toward government critics and away from
government officials."" Professor Jack Balkin, on the other
hand, noted that Sullivan was just as important in that it created
architecture that favored "powerful media organizations" increas-
ing their private power without necessarily granting any power to
private citizens.39 Thus, the case is so important because it cre-
ated an architecture of power that went beyond the protection of
an individual right and created an architecture of power between
the press and the government as well as between the press and
the people.
In addition to providing a metaphor for how law structures
the power relationship between individuals or groups and the
government, social architecture theory is an excellent conceptual
framework for examining how power is distributed among the
branches of government. In this way, social architecture is simply
a new way to describe the important concept of separation of
power outlined by individuals such as James Madison, who wrote
at length about the distribution of power in The Federalist.4 0 As
Packer noted, "While the social architecture metaphor is new in
the law, the idea that law distributes power" was a key issue for
the Framers of the Constitution." In addition, political scientists
have noted that the power structures established by the Constitu-
tion are the beginning of the process, rather than the end. For
example, although they did not use the term social architecture,
basing their analysis on the strategic account ofjudicial decision-
making, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight wrote that members of the
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Packer, supra note 31, at 33 n.23.
38. Packer, supra note 32, at 404.
39. Balkin, supra note 30, at 943. It is important to note that lower courts
continue to struggle with who should receive protection in defamation cases.
Although Sullivan focused on the identity of the plaintiff in a defamation suit
and a later Supreme Court case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971), focused on the subject matter of the defamatory statement, due to dicta
in multiple Supreme Court opinions some lower courts still focus on the iden-
tity of the defendant in defamation cases. These courts continue to hold that
private citizens are not granted the same level of protection-or architecture of
power-as media defendants when sued for defamatory statements. See Ruth
Walden & Derigan Silver, Deciphering Dun & Bradstreet: Does the First Amendment
Matter in Private Figure-Private Concern Defamation Cases?, 14 CoMM. L. & PoL'Y 1,
31-34 (2009).
40. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).
41. Packer, supra note 32, at 398.
2011]1 49
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judiciary must actively balance their desires with the powers and
desires of other government institutions.4 2 They argued that
judges must be strategic actors who consider the preferences of
other actors and the institutional context in which they act.
According to this line of reasoning, judges must be cognizant of
the power structure that exists between the branches of govern-
ment and behave strategically when making decisions that alter
or affect that architecture.
III. ACCESS TO THE COURTS
A. Supreme Court Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that the First Amend-
ment guarantees a broad right of access to criminal judicial pro-
ceedings and documents. It is important to note, however, that
the Court did not initially frame access to the judiciary as a First
Amendment issue. Although the Court addressed judicial
secrecy in a number of cases between 1947 and 1966,43 the Court
discussed access in terms of the Sixth Amendment, not the First,
and said the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial belonged to
the accused, rather than the public or the press. For example,
in a 1979 case involving a pretrial evidence suppression hearing,
the Court wrote, "The Constitution nowhere mentions any right
of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public; its guaran-
tee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the accused."45
In 1978, the Court considered a right of access to judicial
documents in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 6 when televi-
sion networks appealed an order of the U.S. District Court for
42. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10
(1998). See also Robert Lowry Clinton, Game Theory, Legal History, and the Origins
ofJudicial Review: A Revisionist Analysis ofMarbury v. Madison, 38 AM.J. Poul. Sci.
285 (1994); Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A
Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 Am. J. Poul. Sci.
162 (1999); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30
LAw & Soc'v REV. 87 (1996).
43. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1966) (stating
that the Supreme Court has traditionally been unwilling to place direct limita-
tions on the freedom of the news media to report on courtroom proceedings);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965) (discussing the importance of pub-
lic trials); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948) (discussing the "Anglo-
American distrust for secret trials"); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)
("A trial is a public event. Wflhat transpires in the court room is public
property.").
44. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266-68 (discussing the purpose of the
Sixth Amendment).
45. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979).
46. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
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the District of Columbia that held that the networks could not
make copies of tape recordings made by the Nixon administra-
tion and introduced into evidence at the Watergate criminal tri-
als. Although the Court acknowledged a common law right of
access to documents in the possession of the judiciary, instead
of framing the question in terms of access, the Court ducked the
question of a right of access and took a position that was not
argued by either side or contained in any brief.4  Instead of rul-
ing on the existence of a right of access, the Court held that the
release of the records would ultimately be controlled by the Pres-
idential Recordings Act." Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. justified this rationale by relying on a textual analysis
of the Act"o and the reasoning that courts were not as well
equipped to handle the details of access to presidential records
as were the other two branches of government.'" The Court
failed to address any of the major legal issues raised by either side
in a meaningful way, dismissing any access arguments in one
short section by citing Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., Pell v. Procunier
and Zemel for the proposition that the press had no greater rights
of access than the public."
One year later, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale," the Court once
again dismissed the First Amendment claims of the press, focus-
ing on the Sixth Amendment instead. Gannett involved the clo-
sure of a courtroom during a pretrial hearing to suppress
evidence in a murder case.5 4 Although the trial judge indicated
there was a constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings,
he concluded that such a right had to be balanced with the
47. Id. at 597.
48. Id. at 602-03 ("At this point, we normally would be faced with the task
of weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interest
and the duty of the courts. . . . We need not decide how the balance would be
struck if the case were resolved only on the basis of the facts and arguments
reviewed above. There is in this case an additional, unique element that was
neither advanced by the parties nor given appropriate consideration by the
courts below.").
49. Id. at 603. The Presidential Recordings Act is currently codified at 44
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2006).
50. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603 n.15. Both sides argued that the Act did not
apply to the records. The Court quoted from the text of the Act to support its
ruling that it did.
51. Id. at 606.
52. Id. at 608-10 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
53. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
54. Id. at 375.
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accused's right to a fair trial." Relying upon In re OliverP and
Estes v. Texas57 to support its argument, the Court ruled that the
"constitutional guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the
accused."5 ' Although Justice Potter Stewart's majority opinion
discussed the need for transparency in a democracy," ultimately
Stewart concluded that "[r]ecognition of an independent public
interest in the enforcement of Sixth Amendment guarantees is a
far cry . .. from the creation of a constitutional right on the part
of the public."O Stewart avoided discussing Gannett's claim that
the order violated the First Amendment by noting even if there
was such a right,"' the trial judge had already dealt with the issue
by weighing the competing societal interests involved."
Despite these rulings, in 1980-just one year after Gannett-
the Court limited the ability of judges to bar the public from
attending trials based on the First Amendment in Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia and began the process of creating an
architecture of presumptive access. Richmond began when a
judge ordered a courtroom closed during a murder trial.64
Although the trial was over, in a seven-to-one decision that pro-
duced seven different opinions, the Court reversed the order for
closure, holding that the First Amendment prohibited closing a
criminal trial to the public " [a]bsent an overriding interest
articulated in findings."65
The various opinions in Richmond focused heavily on histori-
cal and structural/functional analyses of the First Amendment's
role in self-governance. In part, Gannett explains this-because
the Court had just ruled the previous term there was no constitu-
tional right of access to trials under the Sixth Amendment, the
justices had to distinguish Richmond by finding a right of access in
55. Id. at 392-93.
56. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
57. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
58. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381.
59. Id. at 383.
60. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that even if there had been a com-
mon law right to attend trials that was intended to be incorporated by the Sixth
Amendment, there was certainly no evidence there had ever been a common
law right to attend pretrial hearings. Id. at 387-89.
61. Id. at 392. ("We need not decide in the abstract, however, whether
there is any such constitutional right. For even assuming, arguendo, that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations, a
question we do not decide, this putative right was given all appropriate defer-
ence by the state nisi prius court in the present case.").
62. Id. at 392-93.
63. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
64. Id. at 559.
65. Id. at 581.
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the First Amendment. Although Chief Justice Warren Burger's
plurality opinion distinguished Richmond from Gannett because it
dealt with trials as opposed to pretrial hearings," as Justice Harry
Blackmun pointed out in his concurring opinion, the Gannett
majority wrote twelve separate times that its opinion applied "to
the trial itself."" Thus, as Justice Byron White noted in his con-
curring opinion, because of Gannett the Court was "required" to
make Richmond a First Amendment case.6
Chief Justice Burger's plurality spent ten pages discussing
"the history of criminal trials being presumptively open" and the
benefits openness brings to society." Considering the benefits
of transparency, Burger wrote that "[p]eople in an open society
do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is diffi-
cult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observ-
ing."70 Justice William Brennan's concurring opinion also delved
deeply into historical analysis, examining the "legacy of open jus-
tice" to conclude that "[a] s a matter of law and virtually imme-
morial custom, public trials have been the essentially unwavering
rule in ancestral England and in our own Nation."7'
Chief Justice Burger's plurality also included a functional
analysis of the First Amendment, discussing the "right of access,"
the "right to gather information," and the "right to receive infor-
mation and ideas," all rights he found in the First Amendment. 72
Burger went on to examine "constitutional structure" and the
Framers' intent, reasoning that even though the Constitution
contained no provision explicitly guaranteeing the right to
attend criminal trials, the Court had recognized that some
unenumerated fundamental rights were "indispensable to the
enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."7 1
Justice Brennan's concurrence also discussed democratic
theory, the structural benefits of openness to society,74 how dif-
66. Id. at 564.
67. Id. at 601-02 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring) ("This case would have been
unnecessary had [Gannett] construed the Sixth Amendment to forbid excluding
the public from criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined circum-
stances. But the Court there rejected the submission of four of us to this effect,
thus requiring that the First Amendment issue involved here be addressed."
(emphasis added)).
69. Id. at 564-75 (plurality).
70. Id. at 572.
71. Id. at 590-93 (Brennan, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 576 (plurality). Ultimately, Burger concluded it was not crucial
how the right was described. Id.
73. Id. at 580.
74. Id. at 593-97 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ferent First Amendment theories or values might support a right
of access, and the "countervailing interests" that might justify
restricting access." While Justice John Paul Stevens also dis-
cussed how to balance access and other interests, 6 he wrote that
the case represented a landmark First Amendment decision that
newsgathering was protected. Stevens wrote: "This is a watershed
case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute pro-
tection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never
before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy
matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever."77
Importantly, Justice Stevens' opinion suggested the case was
about a broad right of access that included-but might not be
limited to-access to the judiciary,78 a fact that would later be
discussed by several cases dealing with access to national security
information.
Two years after Richmond, the Court continued to expand
access to the judiciary based on the First Amendment. In Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court7 the Court held unconstitutional a
Massachusetts statute" that had been construed as requiring trial
judges to exclude the press and public from trials for sexual
offenses involving a victim under the age of 18 during the testi-
mony of the victim. Writing for the six-to-three majority, Justice
Brennan held that a court could only deny the constitutional
right of access to trials on a case-by-case basis when the denial was
necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest and was
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
In Globe, Brennan elaborated on the structural benefits
transparency brings. Although Brennan was quick to acknowl-
edge that the right of access to the judiciary was not explicitly
mentioned in the First Amendment, he relied on the Framers'
intent to support his claim that there was a broad constitutional
right of access. He wrote:
[T] he Framers were concerned with broad principles, and
wrote against a background of shared values and practices.
The First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass
those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in
75. Id. at 597-600.
76. Id. at 583 (StevensJ., concurring).
77. Id. at 582.
78. Id. at 584 ("[T]he First Amendment protects the public and the press
from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of
their government").
79. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
80. MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
81. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607.
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the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless neces-
sary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.8 2
Brennan went on to cite and quote previous decisions that
supported the idea that a right of access was protected by the
First Amendment because access was necessary to protect the
free flow of information about government in order to ensure
the proper functioning of a democratic society." Brennan also
wrote that the right of access was protected by the Amendment
both because of the history of open judicial proceedings and the
"particularly significant role" a right of access to the judiciary
"play[ed] .. . in the functioning of the judicial process and the
government as a whole."" Thus, like Stevens' concurring opin-
ion in Richmond, Brennan's language suggested that access to the
judiciary was just one part of a broader constitutional right of
access.
The Court continued to expand access to courtrooms in the
1980s, consistently deciding the cases based on a First Amend-
ment right of access, or at least a need to balance access with the
proper functioning of the judicial system. In 1984, in Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Riverside County Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1) , the
Court ruled that as an integral part of a criminal trial, jury selec-
tion was subject to the First Amendment presumption of open-
ness. In the opinion of the Court, Burger used both the
historical arguments" he articulated in previous cases and Bren-
nan's discussion of the structural benefits openness brings to the
justice system. Perhaps the most detailed First Amendment
argument came in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion. Once
again, the language of Stevens' opinion was not limited to the
benefits of transparency in the judicial process. Returning to his
focus on democratic theory and the benefits of open govern-
ment, Stevens wrote that access to the judiciary was simply a part
of a greater right of access to information held by the
government.88
82. Id. at 604.
83. Id. at 604-05 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966),
and citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Richmond, 448 U.S. at
587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 575 (plurality) (the "expressly guaran-
teed freedoms" of the First Amendment "share a common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government")).
84. Id. at 606.
85. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
86. Id. at 506-08.
87. Id. at 508-10.
88. Id. at 517 (StevensJ., concurring) (quoting Richmond, 448 U.S. at 575
(plurality opinion); id. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring)). In addition, Stevens
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In 1986, in Press Enterprise v. Riverside County Superior Court
(Press-Enterprise I), 89 the Court held that a First Amendment-
based presumption of openness extended to criminal pretrial
hearings as well. Writing for the majority once again, Chief Jus-
tice Burger used both historical and structural arguments to
establish a test for deciding when a particular type ofjudicial pro-
ceeding was presumptively open. Under the so-called "experi-
ence and logic" test, if a court proceeding was traditionally open
to the public and "public access play[ed] a significant positive
role in the functioning of the particular process in question," the
proceeding was presumptively open to the public.o
Interestingly, using historical analysis and First Amendment
theory to support his arguments, Justice Stevens dissented.
Although Stevens again clearly stated his belief that "a proper
construction of the First Amendment embraces a right of access
to information about the conduct of public affairs,"" he dis-
agreed that preliminary hearings in criminal trials should be
open. Citing his own dissent in Globe as well as his own concur-
ring opinion in Richmond, Stevens wrote, "[T]he freedom to
obtain information that the government has a legitimate interest
in not disclosing . .. is far narrower than the freedom to dissemi-
nate information, which is 'virtually absolute' in most con-
texts."" Stevens contended that the majority's historical analysis
did not support a constitutional right of access because Burger's
discussion focused on common law access" while its structural
analysis would go too far, requiring almost all judicial proceed-
ings, including civil and grand jury proceedings, to be open to
the public." Although Stevens reaffirmed his belief in a consti-
tutional right of access, he wrote that in the situation at hand,
"The constitutionally grounded fair trial interests of the accused
if he is bound over for trial, and the reputation interests of the
accused if he is not, provide a substantial reason for delaying
access to the transcript for at least the short time before trial."9
cited two cases, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 681 (1972), in which, according to Stevens, the Court had "implicitly
endorsed" a right of access.
89. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 20.
93. Id. at 24-25.
94. Id. at 26-28.
95. Id. at 29.
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IV. ACCESS TO NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
AND LOCATIONS
A. Supreme Court Cases
Although there is evidence that military documents were
marked "secret" as early as the Revolutionary War, the official
system that controls classified information in the United States
traces its origins to an executive order" issued by Franklin D.
Roosevelt in March 1940." The system was modified shortly
after the conclusion of World War II," and important changes
came again in an executive order issued in September 1951.'9
Nineteen years after President Roosevelt created the modern
classification system, the Supreme Court first reviewed the execu-
tive's ability to classify national security information in a case
involving the government's revocation of a civilian contractor's
security clearance in Greene v. McElroy.ioo Although on the sur-
face the case was not about access to national security informa-
tion, an important dissent in the case made it the first time a
member of the Supreme Court wrote about the power of the
executive branch to prevent access to national security
information.
In 1951, William L. Greene was vice president and general
manager of Engineering and Research Corporation (ERCO), a
company that developed and manufactured various mechanical
and electronic products for the armed forces.1 o' While working
on classified projects, Greene was denied a renewal of his security
clearance based on information indicating he had associated
with Communists, visited officials of the Russian Embassy, and
96. Exec. Order No. 8,381, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1938-1943).
97. HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RES. SERVICE, SECURITY CIASSIFIED AND CON-
TROLLED INFORMATION: HisToRY, STATUS, AND EMERGING MANAGEMENT ISSUES 2
(2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL33494.pdf.
98. Exec. Order No. 10,104, 3 C.F.R. 299 (1949-1953), repfinted as
amended in 18 U.S.C. § 795 (1970).
99. Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789 (1949-1953). There were three
"sweeping innovations" introduced in Executive Order 10,290. First, because
the order indicated the Chief Executive was relying upon "the authority vested
in [him] by the Constitution and statutes, and as President of the United
States," it strengthened the President's discretion to make official secrecy pol-
icy. Second, information was now classified in the interest of "national security"
rather than in the interest of "national defense." Finally, the order extended
classification authority to nonmilitary entities throughout the executive branch
so long as they had "some role in 'national security' policy." See RELYEA, supra
note 97, at 3. For a discussion of the evolution of the ability to classify informa-
tion from 1953 to 2008, see id. at 3-5.
100. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
101. Id. at 475.
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attended a dinner given by an allegedly Communist front organi-
zation.102 Although the court of appeals recognized that Greene
had suffered substantial harm from having his security clearance
revoked, it held that Greene's suit presented no justiciable con-
troversy. That is, the court held there was no controversy present
"which the courts can finally and effectively decide, under tests
and standards which they can soundly administer within their
special field of competence."' The court concluded the execu-
tive branch alone was responsible for the classification of
national security information.""
Although the case presented issues related to the inherent
powers of Congress and the President to control national security
information, avoiding the larger issues presented by the case, the
Supreme Court identified the principle question of law as
whether Greene had been denied due process. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court validated Greene's claim
that the DOD had "denied him 'liberty' and 'property' without
'due process of law' in contravention of the Fifth Amend-
ment."' The Court held that without explicit authorization
from either the President or Congress, the DOD was not empow-
ered to create a security clearance program "under which
affected persons may lose their jobs and may be restrained in
following their chosen professions on the basis of fact determina-
tions concerning their fitness for clearance made in proceedings
in which they are denied the traditional procedural safeguards of
confrontation and cross-examination."' 0 Thus, the majority was
very clear that it was steering away from legal questions of access
and executive power.' 07
102. Id. at 478.
103. Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("Greene
makes no claim of lack of compliance by the Government with its own regula-
tions. He attacks the Secretary's decision on its merits and as a matter of consti-
tutional right. But for a court to hear de novo the evidence as to Greene's
fitness to be assigned to a particular kind of confidential work would be a boot-
less task, involving judgments remote from the experience and competence of
the judiciary.").
104. Id. ("[A]ny meaningful judgment in such matters must rest on con-
siderations of policy, and decisions as to comparative risks, appropriate only to
the executive branch of the Government. It must rest also on a mass of informa-
tion, much of it secret, not appropriate for judicial appraisal." (citing Dayton v.
Dulles, 254 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 144
(1958))).
105. Greene, 360 U.S. at 492.
106. Id. at 493.
107. See id. at 508 (reiterating that the Court was not deciding "whether
the President has inherent authority" to create a program that suspended due
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Justice Tom C. Clark, however, wrote an important dissent-
ing opinion, which argued the case presented a "clear and sim-
ple" legal question: was there a constitutional right of access to
government information?'o Taking this characterization of the
case directly from the Solicitor General's brief,o" Clark was criti-
cal of the majority's narrowing of the issue as well as its reason-
ing. He argued that the Court was ignoring "the basic
consideration in the case . .. that no person, save the President,
has a constitutional right to access to governmental secrets.""o
Clark wrote that although the majority's opinion claimed to avoid
answering the constitutional question of the executive branch's
ability to classify information, its decision was actually establish-
ing a dangerous precedent during a dangerous time. Alluding to
the Cold War, Clark wrote that the Court's decision to strike
down the program "for lack of specific authorization" was
"indeed strange, and hard for me to understand at this critical
time of national emergency."'" In addition, although the major-
ity opinion never mentioned a "right of access" and Clark's dis-
sent did not specifically mention a First Amendment right of
access to government information, Clark concluded that the
majority opinion would be read to guarantee some sort of broad
right of access in the future. 1 2
In Zemel v. Rusk, a case which would later be cited by a num-
ber of access cases, the Court was asked to determine if Louis
Zemel had a First Amendment right to travel to Cuba in order to
"satisfy [his] curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba and make
[himself] a better informed citizen." "'s In 1962, roughly one
year after the United States broke diplomatic ties with Cuba and
declared U.S. passports invalid for travel to Cuba "unless specifi-
cally endorsed for such travel under the authority of the Secre-
tary of State,""' Zemel filed a suit seeking ajudgment declaring
that he was "entitled under the Constitution and laws of the
process, "whether congressional action" was necessary to create such a program,
or even "what the limits on executive or legislative authority may be").
108. Id. at 510-11 (Clark, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 511 n.1 ("My brother Harlan very kindly credits me with 'color-
ful characterization' in stating this as the issue. While I take great pride in
authorship, I must say that in this instance I merely agreed with the statement
of the issue by the Solicitor General and his co-counsel in five different places
in the Brief for the United States.").
110. Id. at 513.
111. Id. at 515.
112. Id. at 524.
113. 381 U.S. 1, 4 (1965).
114. Id. at 3.
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United States to travel to Cuba and to have his passport validated
for that purpose."' "
Although the Court acknowledged that banning travel to
Cuba and "the Secretary's refusal to validate passports for Cuba
renders less than wholly free the flow of information concerning
that country," it refused to acknowledge the existence of a First
Amendment issue."' Instead, relying on a First Amendment the-
ory that did not embrace newsgathering, the Court concluded,
"The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unre-
strained right to gather information."'
While the majority did not agree there was a First Amend-
ment issue at stake, a dissent authored by Justice William 0.
Douglas and joined by Justice Arthur Goldberg identified a
"peripheral" First Amendment issue presented by the case. Rely-
ing on Kent v. Dulles,"' Douglas concluded the Court had already
established that the right to travel both at home and overseas was
protected by the Constitution."' Delving deeper into First
Amendment theory, Douglas used a classic marketplace of ideas
approach to support his contention that although the Secretary
could prevent travel to dangerous locations, Cuba did not qualify
as such a location.
[Tlhe only so-called danger present here is the Commu-
nist regime in Cuba. The world, however, is filled with
Communist thought; and Communist regimes are on more
than one continent. They are part of the world spectrum;
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. at 16-17. ("We must agree that the Secretary's refusal to validate
passports for Cuba renders less than wholly free the flow of information con-
cerning that country. While we further agree that this is a factor to be consid-
ered in determining whether appellant has been denied due process of law, we
cannot accept the contention of appellant that it is a First Amendment right
which is involved. For to the extent that the Secretary's refusal to validate pass-
ports for Cuba acts as an inhibition (and it would be unrealistic to assume that
it does not), it is an inhibition of action. There are few restrictions on action
which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased
data flow.").
117. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
118. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
119. Zemel 381 U.S. at 23-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("We held in Kent
v. Dulles that the right to travel overseas, as well as at home, was part of the
citizen's liberty under the Fifth Amendment. That conclusion was not an eso-
teric one drawn from the blue. It reflected a judgment as to the peripheral
rights of the citizen under the First Amendment. The right to know, to con-
verse with others, to consult with them, to observe social, physical, political and
other phenomena abroad as well as at home gives meaning and substance to
freedom of expression and freedom of the press.").
MEDIA CENSOIRSHIP AND ACCESS TO TERRORISM TRIALS 
and if we are to know them and understand them, we must
mingle with them ....
The First Amendment presupposes a mature people,
not afraid of ideas. The First Amendment leaves no room
for the official, whether truculent or benign, to say nay or
yea because the ideas offend or please him or because he
believes some political objective is served by keeping the
citizen at home or letting him go.' 20
Douglas concluded his opinion: "Restrictions on the right to
travel in times of peace should be so particularized that a First
Amendment right is not precluded unless some clear counter-
vailing national interest stands in the way of its assertion."' 2 '
In 1988, a majority opinion finally addressed a right of
access when the Court, in Department ofNavy v. Egan,'22 ruled that
it was solely the executive's role to classify and protect informa-
tion and make decisions about access to national security infor-
mation. In 1983, Thomas M. Egan lost his position at the
Trident Naval Refit Facility in Bremerton, Washington when he
was denied a required security clearance.' Egan appealed the
decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board as provided by
the section of the U.S. Code under which he was dismissed.124
Although Egan initially won his appeal to the head of the Board,
after the full Board ruled it had no power to review security clear-
ance decisions, he appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit. The court of appeals, by a divided vote, reversed the
full Board's decision that the Board had no authority to review
the merits of a security-clearance decision. 125
Identifying two legal issues presented-the right of access to
information and the power of the executive branch-in a five-to-
three decision, the Court reversed. Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion began by noting, "It should be obvious that no one has a
'right' to a security clearance." 26 Blackmun wrote that although
the statutory language of § 7513, which granted the power to
review employment decisions to the Board was important, the
120. Id. at 25-26.
121. Id. at 26.
122. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
123. Id. at 520. Egan was denied clearance based upon California and
Washington state criminal records for assault and being a felon in possession of
a gun and for his failure to disclose on his application for federal employment
two earlier convictions for carrying a loaded firearm. Id. at 521.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982).
125. Egan v. Dep't of Navy, 802 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
126. Egan, 484 U.S. at 528.
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statute did not fundamentally alter the power of the executive
under the Constitution to control national security information:
The President, after all, is the Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States. His authority to clas-
sify and control access to information bearing on national
security and to determine whether an individual is suffi-
ciently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive
Branch that will give that person access to such informa-
tion flows primarily from this constitutional investment of
power in the President and exists quite apart from any
explicit congressional grant.'2 7
Next, Blackmun wrote there was a compelling need to keep
information secret and the executive branch had the unique abil-
ity to decide what should be kept secret, noting that the Cou rt
had long "recognized the Government's 'compelling interest' in
withholding national security information from unauthorized
persons in the course of executive business."' 28 He wrote that
"'for reasons . . . too obvious to call for enlarged discussion,' the
protection of classified information must be committed to the
broad discretion of the agency responsible" 29 and it was "the
generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and
responsibility of the Executive.""3o In conclusion he wrote,
"Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise,
courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the
authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs."' '
B. Lower Court Cases
In 1973, in Brunnenkant v. Laird,132 a relatively obscure and
rarely cited case,'"' the D.C. District Court ruled that the First
Amendment prevented the government from removing Siegfried
127. Id. at 527.
128. Id. (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980);
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 10 (1953); Totten v. United States, 9 U.S. 105, 106 (1876)).
129. Id. at 529 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 (1985)).
130. Id. (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)).
131. Id. at 530 (citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953);
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 144 (1953); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,
10 (1973); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757-58 (1975); Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)).
132. 360 F.Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1973).
133. Westlaw.com's "Citing References" function reported only a single,
unreported case that cited Brunnenkant, Doviak v. Dep't of the Navy, Appeal No.
01860381, 1987 WL 908627 (E.E.O.C. 1987).
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Brunnenkant's security clearance solely for voicing his social and
political opinions.134 Although the court noted that in most
cases involving national security the key legal issue was to balance
competing interests, it wrote there was no need to engage in bal-
ancing here because the evidence overwhelmingly showed that
Brunnenkant, a resident alien in the employ of a private contrac-
tor working for the U.S. government, lost his security clearance
solely for voicing "heterodox political, social and economic
views."1 3 ' Relying upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Bridges v.
California'3 and "other opinions too numerous to cite,"'87 Dis-
trict Judge John H. Pratt granted Brunnenkant's request for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Although Pratt mentioned "bal-
ancing" competing interests in his opinion, he did not address
any separation of powers issues. At no point did he mention
deferring to the executive in matters of national security, hint
that the court might be exercising its power in an area in was not
meant to, or even cite Greene.'38
Four years later, in 1977, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
heard two access cases. The first, United States v. American Tele-
phone & Telegraph, Co.,' 3" addressed national security informa-
tion and the inherent power of both the executive and legislative
branches of government. In the course of an investigation into
the Justice Department's wiretapping program, the Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce issued a subpoena for all
national security request letters in the possession of the Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T). The Justice Depart-
ment sued to enjoin AT&T from complying with the subpoena
on the grounds "that compliance might lead to public disclosure
of the documents, with adverse effect on national security."l4
The court focused almost entirely on the separation of pow-
ers issues. First, the court addressed what it considered the "pri-
mary issue"' 41 of the case, the political question doctrine.14 2
134. Brunnenkant, 360 F.Supp. at 1332. ("[T]he withdrawal of plaintiff's
security clearance, as a result of his expressions of opinion, is an unconstitu-
tional invasion of his rights under the First Amendment.").
135. Id.
136. 314 U.S. 252 (1942).
137. Brunnenkant, 360 F.Supp. at 1332.
138. The entire opinion only cites one case other than Bridges, United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
139. 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
140. Id. at 123-24.
141. Id. at 125-26.
142. The political question doctrine deals with the appropriateness of
having a case decided by a court. A political question is one "that a court will
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Both the legislative branch and the executive branch claimed in
their briefs that the court did not have the authority to make a
"determination of the propriety of [their] acts."' 43 While Con-
gress based its claim of "absolute discretion" on the Speech or
Debate Clause,' 4 4 the executive relied "on its obligation to safe-
guard the national security."'4 5
The court disagreed with both parties, holding that "neither
the traditional political question doctrine nor any close adapta-
tion thereof is appropriate where neither of the conflicting polit-
ical branches has a clear and unequivocal constitutional title, and
it is or may be possible to establish an effective judicial settle-
ment."'46 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's 1962 decision in
Baker v. Carr,'47 the court noted that simply because a political
controversy or conflict existed between the other two branches of
government did not inherently mean the issue was beyond the
competency of the judiciary to decide.' 4 8 Instead, the court
wrote, the political question doctrine applied when only one
branch had the "constitutional authority" to make a decision that
would settle the dispute." '
The court then discussed at length which branch had the
constitutional authority to control information classified for
national security purposes. The court relied on the Framers'
intent and the text of the Constitution, in combination with the
Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer,s' to reach its conclusion. First, the court concluded that the
not consider because it involves the exercise of discretionary power by the exec-
utive or legislative branch." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004).
143. AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127.
144. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
145. AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127 n.17.
146. Id. at 127.
147. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
148. AT&T, 567 F.2d at 126.
149. Id. In addition, in a footnote the court cited a number of cases to
support its conclusion that "disputes concerning the allocation of power
between the branches have often been judicially resolved." Id. at n.13 (citing
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v.
Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 420 U.S. 136
(1975); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973)).
150. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579. Youngstown involved an executive order
issued in response to a strike called by the American Steel Workers Union in
the latter part of 1951. The order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of most of the steel mills in the country and keep them running.
The Supreme Court held that the seizure order was not within the constitu-
tional power of the President.
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Framers did not intend for absolute authority over any area of
governance to rest with any of the three branches. According to
the court's opinion, the Framers expected that when "conflicts in
scope of authority arose between the coordinate branches, a
spirit of dynamic compromise would promote resolution of the
dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effec-
tive functioning of our governmental system."1 5'
Next, moving from the Framers' intent to textualism, the
opinion addressed the executive branch's claim that the Consti-
tution conferred upon it absolute power in the arena of national
security. Judge Harold Leventhal wrote that such a claim was not
supported through textual analysis.' 5 2 However, "most signifi-
cant" to Judge Leventhal was "the fact that the Constitution is
largely silent on the question of allocation of powers associated
with foreign affairs and national security."' 5 ' The opinion then
invoked Justice Robert H. Jackson's much quoted passage from
Youngstown that such powers are "within a 'zone of twilight' in
which the President and Congress share authority or in which its
distribution is uncertain."l54
Thus, after also determining that it did not "accept the con-
cept that Congress' investigatory power is absolute,"'-5 the court
attempted to balance the executive's interest in national security
and Congress' interest in investigating the warrantless wiretap-
ping program by using a "gradual approach."15 ' However, while
the court's balancing approach was somewhat analogous to the
majority's opinion in Greene, it framed the case much closer to
Clark's dissent, focusing on control of national security
information.
151. AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127.
152. Id. at 128.
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Jackson's full quotation reads:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent pow-
ers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. There-
fore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes,
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on inde-
pendent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contempo-
rary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
155. AT&fT, 567 F.2d at 130.
156. Id. at 131.
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Just a few months after its decision in AT&T, the D.C. Cir-
cuit was called upon in Sherrill v. Knight'5 7 to determine if the
First Amendment rights of ajournalist were violated by the White
House's refusal to grant a press pass. While the case did not
directly implicate national security information per se, it was
decided as an access case, dealing with the ability of the executive
branch of the government to curtail newsgathering based on
concerns related to the safety of the President, and containing a
detailed discussion of a constitutionally based right to know.
In 1966, when Robert Sherrill, the White House correspon-
dent for The Nation, was denied a press pass based on the results
of an investigation by the Secret Service, he filed for relief in
federal district court, alleging that the denial of a press pass vio-
lated the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.' 5 8
When it reached the D.C. Court of Appeals, the circuit court
found the case implicated the First and Fifth Amendments and
the right of access.'" First, however, the court dealt with the
issue of justiciability 0 and the executive's constitutional power,
soundly rejecting the government's attempt to frame the case in
terms of separation of powers and its argument that the Constitu-
tion prohibited the judiciary from ruling on the case because
access to the White House and the safety of the President were
outside the power of the judiciary.'"'
Citing Pell v. Procunier'62 and dicta from Zemel'"3 for the
respective propositions that the press had no greater First
Amendment right of access than the general public and the gen-
eral public had no First Amendment right of access to the White
157. 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
158. See Forcade v. Knight, 416 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1975). Thomas
Forcade, a correspondent for the Alternate Press Syndicate who was also denied
a White House press pass, was a second party to the complaint in the district
court case. Although the judgment of the district court pertained to both For-
cade and Sherrill, Forcade disclaimed further interest in the case after the par-
ties appealed, but before the court of appeals ruled. Shenill, 569 F.2d at 126
n.1.
159. Shenritl, 569 F. 2d at 128.
160. Ajusticiable case is one that is "capable of being disposed of judi-
cially." BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 882 (8th ed. 2004).
161. Sherrill, 569 F. 2d at 128 n.14.
162. 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) ("The Constitution does not, however,
require government to accord the press special access to information not
shared by members of the public generally.").
163. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) ("For example, the prohibi-
tion of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's
opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of
the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White
House a First Amendment right.").
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House, the government argued that denial of a White House
press pass would violate the First Amendment "only if it is based
upon the content of the journalist's speech or otherwise discrimi-
nates against a class of protected speech."' 6 1 While the court
wrote that denying a press pass on content-based criteria would
be problematic, it also concluded that there were additional First
Amendment arguments to consider. Chief among these was "the
protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press."'6 5 Citing a host of Supreme
Court decisions, the court concluded:
[T]he protection afforded newsgathering under the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press, requires
that this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than
compelling reasons. Not only newsmen and the publica-
tions for which they write, but also the public at large have
an interest protected by the first amendment in assuring
that restrictions on newsgathering be no more arduous
than necessary, and that individual newsmen not be arbi-
trarily excluded from sources of information.'16
However, although the court clearly identified the First
Amendment issue in the case, its focus on the specific pragmatic
concerns of the case led it to conclude that while denial of a
press pass could violate the First and Fifth Amendments, neither
amendment justified requiring "the articulation of detailed crite-
ria upon which the granting or denial of White House press
passes is to be based."'" 7 Instead, the court ordered the Secret
Service to "publish or otherwise make publicly known the actual
standard employed in determining whether an otherwise eligible
journalist will obtain a White House press pass."'68 Additionally,
the court wrote that it expected courts to "be appropriately defer-
ential to the Secret Service's determination of what justifies the
inference that an individual constitutes a potential risk to the
physical security of the President or his family."'69
164. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 129-30. The court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681,
707 (1972), and PelI, 417 U.S. at 829-35, for the proposition that the First
Amendment protected newsgathering; Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546 (1975), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), as requiring that
access for the purpose of newsgathering not be denied for "less than compel-
ling reasons"; and Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975), and
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), for the
conclusion that the public had a right to receive information.
167. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 128.
168. Id. at 130.
169. Id.
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In 1991, the Southern District of New York considered the
existence of a First Amendment right of access to a foreign arena
in which American military forces were engaged in Nation Maga-
zine v. Department of Defense.o The case involved a challenge to
the DOD regulations governing press coverage of American mili-
tary activities during periods of open hostilities. While the plain-
tiffs raised First Amendment right of access issues, the
government put forth a variety of arguments involving jus-
ticiability and separation of powers, including standing, the polit-
ical question doctrine and mootness."' In addition, before
deciding these issues, the court stated that even in "the event the
Court determines that at least some of the issues are not moot
and that there is jurisdiction to hear the claims, a question
remains whether the Court should exercise its power to address
the controversy."'7
Focusing on precedents, the court determined that a "long
line of cases addressing the role of the judiciary in reviewing mili-
tary decisions" had left the clear message that "[c]ivilian courts
should 'hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the
court to tamper with the . . . necessarily unique structure of the
Military Establishment.' ",7 Yet, despite this strong language
that seemed to favor the government's position that the case was
outside judicial power, the court was unwilling to go so far as to
accept the government's claim that all cases involving the mili-
tary were outside the power of Article III courts. 174 Instead, the
court found the cases cited by the government differed from the
case at hand in that they had involved "direct challenges to the
institutional functioning of the military in such areas as the rela-
tionship between personnel, discipline, and training." 175 Unlike
that line of cases, the court ruled that the present case did not
impact the executive's foreign relations powers or require the
170. 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
171. Id. at 1565.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 1566-67 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300
(1983)).
174. Id. at 1568 (concluding the plaintiffs' complaint alleged "claims that
are judicially enforceable under the First and Fifth Amendments"). The court
found the DOD's primary argument that "the political question doctrine bars
an Article III court from adjudicating any claims that involve the United States
military" unpersuasive. The court went on to state that "[u]nder this theory of
separation of powers, a court would lack jurisdiction to hear any controversy
that involved DOD, including any government actions that violated the rights of
non-military personnel. This reasoning is inconsistent with large bodies of con-
stitutional law." Id.
175. Id. at 1567.
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court to move beyond its traditional area of expertise and, there-
fore, was justiciable.1 6 On the issue of declaratory relief the
court ruled that because the plaintiffs asserted that the existence
of the DOD restrictions violated the First Amendment generally,
and not simply as applied to operations in the Middle East, the
court could hear the challenge.
Unfortunately for the media plaintiffs, that did not end the
court's discussion. The court then wrote: "The question of the
court's power to hear a case is, however, only the beginning of
the inquiry. A separate and more difficult inquiry is whether it is
appropiate for a Court to exercise that power.""' Thus, although
the court presented the case as dealing with a conflict between
transparency and national security, the court also stated that it
needed to consider what branch of government should strike the
balance between these two competing interests:
At issue in this action are important First Amendment prin-
ciples and the countervailing national security interests of
this country. This case presents a novel question since the
right of the American public to be informed about the
functioning of government and the need to limit informa-
tion availability for reasons of national security both have a
secure place in this country's constitutional history. In
short, this case involves the adjudication of important con-
stitutional principles. The question, however, is not only
which principles apply and the weighing of the principles,
but also when and in what circumstances it is best to con-
sider the questions.' 78
To determine if it should exercise its power, the court turned to a
detailed discussion of First Amendment theory, specifically
whether theories related to self-governance and the checking
function of the press supported the establishment of a right to
know.
Although the media organizations argued that they were not
asking the court to establish a new constitutional right of access
that required "affirmative assistance" from the government to
provide information,' 7 9 the court reasoned that the case involved
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1570 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 1571.
179. Id. ("The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that, under the First
Amendment, the press has a right to gather and report news that involves
United States military operations and that DOD's pool regulations are an
unconstitutional limitation on access to observe events as they occur. . . . In
other words, plaintiffs claim that no affirmative assistance from the government
2011] 169
170 NO7E DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PU3LIC POLICY [Vol. 25
charting "new constitutional territory."' The court wrote that
while the Supreme Court had considered cases involving the
First Amendment and national security, none of those cases had
directly addressed "the role and limits of news gathering under
the First Amendment in a military context abroad," and there-
fore there was no direct precedent to rely upon."" Instead, the
court turned to "case law on questions involving the access rights
of the press and public" to answer the novel constitutional ques-
tions involving a right to access to military endeavors and
whether press pools violated that right.'8
Citing United States v. Nixon,'" Saxbe v. Washington Post,'
Pell v. Procunier"' Houchins v. KQED,'" and Greer v. Spock,'" the
court concluded "there is no right of access of the press to fora
which have traditionally been characterized as private or closed
to the public, such as meetings involving the internal discussions
of government officials,"' 8 and limitations may be "placed on
access to government controlled institutions.""' Next, however,
the opinion cited the judicial access cases Richmond' and
Globe' as examples of the Supreme Court's support for a First
Amendment-based right to know:
A fundamental theme in Richmond and Globe was the
importance of an informed American citizenry. As the
Court wrote, guaranteed access of the public to occur-
rences in a courtroom during a criminal trial assures "free-
dom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government." Learning about, criticizing
and evaluating government, the Supreme Court has rea-
is being requested, only the freedom from interference to report on what is
overtly happening in an allegedly open area.").
180. Id. at 1572.
181. Id. The court cited Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722-23 (1971), and Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1980) as examples of the cases in which the
Supreme Court had considered the balance between the First Amendment and
national security.
182. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1571.
183. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
184. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
185. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
186. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
187. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
188. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1571 (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705
n.15).
189. Id. (citing Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16; Greer, 424 U.S. at 838; Saxbe, 417
U.S. at 850; Pell, 417 U.S. at 828).
190. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
191. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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soned, requires some "right to receive" information and
ideas.' 92
In addition, the court suggested that in Globe the Court
implied that access to other situations might also be included in
the Amendment' 9 3 and pointed out thatJustice Stevens had writ-
ten that the right to be informed about government operations
was important "even when the government has suggested that
national security concerns were implicated."' The court
summarized:
Given the broad grounds invoked in these holdings, the
affirmative right to gather news, ideas and information is
certainly strengthened by these cases. By protecting the
press, the flow of information to the public is preserved.
As the Supreme Court has observed, "the First Amendment
goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression
of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public
may draw." Viewing these cases collectively, it is arguable
that generally there is at least some minimal constitutional
right to access.'9 5
Having established the existence of some sort of right of
access, the court speculated about how this would apply to the
military. Although the court concluded that at least some right
of access to the military might exist, it was uncertain because
"military operations are not closely akin to a building such as a
prison, nor to a park or a courtroom."" Ultimately, based on
this uncertainty, the hypothetical nature of its discussion and the
lack of concrete facts on which to apply precedent, the court
refused to decide if there was a right of access. The Court wrote,
"Pursuant to long-settled policy in the disposition of constitu-
tional questions, courts should refrain from deciding issues
presented in a highly abstract form, especially in instances where
the Supreme Court has not articulated guiding standards."'
192. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728
(1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
195. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
The court further cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972), for the
proposition that "[w]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom
of the press could be eviscerated."
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Rescue Army Mun. Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549,
575-85(1947)).
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The Court next considered whether the DOD's use of press
pools gave preferential treatment to some members of the press.
Again the court turned to Supreme Court precedent to support
its discussion, this time focusing on the Court's public forum
doctrine. First, the court discussed precedent that supported the
plaintiffs' case, finding that because the government had decided
to "open the door" to press coverage it had "created a place for
expressive activity."'" The Court wrote, "Regardless of whether
the government is constitutionally required to open the battle-
field to the press as representatives of the public, a question that
this Court has declined to decide, once the government does so
it is bound to do so in a non-discriminatory manner."' 9 Citing
Sherrill, the court ruled that government could not arbitrarily
exclude some members of the press once it allowed others to
cover the conflict.200
The court, however, then noted that the right to be free
from discriminatory treatment was "not synonymous with a guar-
anteed right to gather news at all times and places or in any man-
ner that may be desired"20' and the press could be subjected to
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.0 2 Thus, the
court concluded that some restrictions might be appropriate at
some point. After reaching this conclusion, however, the court
declined to decide the issue. Instead, it concluded it was not
faced with concrete enough facts to rule on the limitations on
access. 20 Faced with two "significant and novel constitutional
doctrines "204 and without clear direction from the Supreme
Court or concrete facts to rule on, the court concluded that
"based on all the circumstances of the case," the controversy was
not "sufficiently concrete and focused to permit adjudication on
the merits."20 s
198. Id. at 1573 (citing Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983), for the proposition that the government had created a
limited public forum by establishing pools for coverage for the Persian Gulf
conflict).
199. Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); American
Broad. Cos. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)).
200. Id. ("Once a limited public forum has been created, the government
is under an obligation to insure that 'access not be denied arbitrarily or for less
than compelling reasons."' (quoting Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C.
Cir. 1977))).
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972)).
203. Id. at 1574-75.
204. Id. at 1575.
205. Id. at 1568.
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While to this day the Supreme Court has still not provided
any clear direction, the D.C. District Court has twice decided
cases very similar to Nation Magazine with nearly identical results.
In Getty Images News Service Co. v. Department of Defense20 6 and Flynt
v. Rumsfeld,207 the court engaged in similar First Amendment dis-
cussions as the Nation Magazine court, relied on almost identical
precedents and again focused on the lack of a concrete contro-
versy. In Getty Images, a case involving access to the U.S. govern-
ment's detention center at Guantinamo Bay, the D.C. District
Court discussed access, but ultimately determined that Getty had
failed to demonstrate that injunctive relief was needed.208 In the
case, Getty Images News Services sought a preliminary injunction
to enjoin the DOD to provide Getty with equal access to the
detention facilities at Guantinamo Bay, to require the DOD to
"promulgate standards and procedures ensuring equal access,"
and to compel the DOD to create a press pool for access to
Guantinamo. 209 Getty alleged that the DOD's actions violated
the company's First Amendment right to equal access to Guantd-
namo and Fifth Amendment right to equal protection, and that
the company's First and Fifth Amendment rights had been vio-
lated "because adequate regulatory standards had not been
developed and applied." 2 10
In considering Getty's claim, the court primarily relied upon
Sherrill and Nation Magazine to reach its conclusions. The court
used these two cases to support Getty's argument that once the
DOD "opened Guantdnamo Bay to certain members of the press,
all members of the press became constitutionally entitled to
equal access to the detention facilities there."21 1 In addition,
after a discussion of Shernill, the court concluded that, although it
was "reluctant to interfere" with military conduct, 212 the First and
206. 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002).
207. 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003).
208. Getty Images, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 118-25.
209. Id. at 113-14. In addition, Getty also sought to enjoin the DOD
from excluding it from participation in the National Media Pool or any ad hoc
or regional pools created during Operation Enduring Freedom. However, by
the time the case reached the district court, Getty was granted membership in
the National Media Pool and the Afghanistan regional pool no longer existed.
See id. at 14-16.
210. Id. at 114. In addition, the media company argued its due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated because the company's com-
petitors "had allegedly been delegated the power to regulate Getty's access to
pool coverage." Id.
211. Id. at 118.
212. Id. at 121. The court agreed with the government's arguments "that
the Guantinamo Bay Naval Base [was] not a public forum and that considera-
tion of Getty's First and Fifth Amendment claims must be undertaken through
1732011]
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Fifth Amendments required, "at a minimum, that before deter-
mining which media organizations receive the limited access
available" there must be some reasonable criteria to guide the
DOD decisions.21 1 Quoting the Sherrill court's discussion of First
Amendment protection for newsgathering, 214 the court deter-
mined that the First Amendment required the government to
have solid reasoning behind its decisions and refrain from arbi-
trary or capricious decision making.215
Ultimately, however, the court ruled that it was not the
appropriate time to grant Getty's motion for an injunction.
Although the court wrote that it was persuaded that Getty had
raised "a serious question" relating to its request for equal access
and that the DOD "at some point in time" would have to estab-
lish and publish non-arbitrary criteria and a process to govern
media access, the court would not grant Getty's injunction. 216
To support this ruling, the court balanced Getty's interests and
likelihood of success against the public's interest in not granting
access.217 The court weighed the potential harm to the public
interest that a disruption at Guant;inamo Bay would cause
against Getty's "speculative" First Amendment claims."' The
court reasoned that "absent some concrete and irreparable dimi-
nution of First Amendment rights," it was "not possible to con-
clude that the public interest favors the injunctive relief Getty
seeks."219 In its conclusion, the district court focused on the
speculative nature of both a First Amendment right of access and
Getty's claims that it was being harmed to support the decision
220
not to grant an injunction.20 One year later, the court adopted
a similar stance in Flynt.
Like Nation Magazine, Flynt involved a magazine's claim that
DOD regulations violated the "qualified First Amendment right"
the prism of the heightened deference due to military regulations and decision-
making." Id. at 119.
213. Id. at 121.
214. Id. at 119 (quoting Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129-30 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)).
215. Id. at 121.
216. Id. at 124.
217. Id. At no time did the court consider the public's interest in receiving
information about the Guantinamo Bay detention facility, terrorists or terror-
ism trials.
218. Id. at 123-24.
219. Id. at 124. While the court found in favor of Getty on parts one and
two of the test, it found that the public interest outweighed the speculative
nature of Getty's claims. Id.
220. Id.
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of media access to the battlefield.22 ' While the court discussed
the First Amendment implications of access, it focused instead
on the hypothetical nature of the claim and the need to practice
judicial restraint in such situations. In 2001, Hustler Magazine
requested that one of its correspondents be allowed "to accom-
pany and cover American ground forces in Afghanistan and
wherever else such forces may be utilized in this campaign
against terrorism. "2 While the Hustler correspondent was
placed on a waiting list of journalists seeking to embed with con-
ventional combat troops, because all of the ground forces in
Afghanistan at the time were Special Operations Forces, the cor-
respondent was not allowed to accompany any soldiers on actual
missions.223 In what would become a central argument to the
case, the DOD claimed that it was "awaiting approval to allow
reporters to accompany special forces on missions."224
In challenging the DOD's regulations, Hustler made two dis-
tinct claims. First, the magazine challenged the DOD regulations
as applied,225 charging that the DOD violated Hustler's First
Amendment rights by "improperly denying a Hustler correspon-
dent the right to accompany combat forces on the ground in
Afghanistan."2 2 Second, the magazine brought a facial chal-
lenge. 227 The opinion first considered Hustler's as-applied chal-
lenge. The court held that it had no jurisdiction to address the
issue because the controversy was not ripe for review, nor did
Hustler have standing. Although Hustler attempted to insert the
First Amendment into the argument by contending that a ripe
controversy existed because the parties disagreed as to whether
there was "a First Amendment right of media access to the battle-
field,"228 the court wrote that the "mere existence of a legal disa-
greement about the scope of the First Amendment [did] not
make that disagreement fit for judicial review."'2  Instead,
221. Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99 (D.D.C. 2003).
222. Id. at 97.
223. Id. at 97-98.
224. Id. at 99.
225. "A claim that a law or government policy, though constitutional on
its face, is unconstitutional as applied, usually because of a discriminatory
effect; a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case
or in its application to a particular party." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 244 (8th
ed. 2004).
226. Flynt, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
227. "A claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face-that is, that it
always operates unconstitutionally." BLACK's LAw DIcrlONARY 244 (8th ed.
2004).
228. Flynt, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 102.
229. Id.
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because the DOD was still technically "awaiting permission" to
allowjournalists to travel with the only troops on the ground, the
court held the issue had not been settled and was, therefore, not
ripe for review. It wrote Hustler's as-applied claims were "not fit
for judicial decision at this juncture because defendants have not
made a final decision with respect to plaintiffs' request for access
to combat ground forces in battle."23 0
Next, considering Hustler's facial challenge, although the
court admitted that "there may be a limited or qualified right of
media access to the battlefield""' based on the First Amend-
ment, it declined to definitively decide the issue. Instead, the
court turned to the issue of judicial power, writing that the case
was more about the role of the courts in making decisions than it
was about the First Amendment. The court held it could decide
the case under the political question doctrine because Hustler was
not making a claim that went to "the heart of the military's
'goals, directives and tactics"' by challenging the DOD's regula-
tions.232 The court wrote:
In their facial challenge claims plaintiffs do not ask the
Court to delve into tactical decisions made by defendants.
They ask the Court only to consider whether a First
Amendment right of media access to the battlefield
exists-a right they themselves characterize as a 'qualified
right of access' subject to reasonable Executive Branch reg-
ulations-and, if so, to direct defendants to enact guide-
lines that comport with such First Amendment
protections.2
However, the court never truly addressed the existence of a
First Amendment "qualified right of access." Instead the court
ruled that just because it had jurisdiction to hear the facial chal-
lenge, that conclusion did "not necessarily result ... in adjudica-
tion of plaintiffs' claims on the merits at this time."234 Quoting
the admonition from Getty Images that "the absence of a concrete
controversy is of particular concern in light of the important con-
stitutional issues at stake and the national defense interests that
might be implicated,"2 3 ' as well as a lengthy passage from Nation
230. Id. at 101.
231. Id. at 108.
232. Id. at 106-07.
233. Id. at 107.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 109 (quoting Getty Images News Servs. Corp. v. Dep't of
Defense, 193 F. Supp. 2d 112, 113, 118 (D.D.C. 2002)).
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Magazine,"3 the court concluded the "prudent course" was to
"delay resolution of these constitutional issues until and unless
plaintiffs are denied access after having pursued their request
through normal military channels." 237 The court therefore
"declined to exercise its discretion" to consider the facial
challenge."
V. CONCLUSION
There are a number of significant differences between
access cases involving the judiciary and access cases involving
national security, and comparing the cases leads to a number of
interesting conclusions. First, it is clear that the Supreme Court
has sent mixed signals to lower courts about the existence of a
First Amendment based right of access. With the exception of a
few early cases, the Court has framed access to judicial proceed-
ings as a First Amendment issue that advances trust in the judi-
cial system and the democratic process. As the Nation Magazine
court noted, in cases that have considered a right of access to the
judiciary, the Supreme Court has consistently articulated a broad
right of access-a right that might not even be limited to the
judiciary."' In addition, the opinions in these cases reference a
wide range of sources for this right, including Framers' intent,
structural and functional analysis, and historical evidence. How-
ever, because the discussion of a broad right of access that
extends beyond judicial proceedings and documents has never
been fully articulated or endorsed by the Court, lower courts
considering access to national security information or locations
have had trouble determining when or if there is a right of
access. For example, as noted, when faced with the question, the
236. Id. ("In order to decide this case on the merits, it would be necessary
to define the outer constitutional boundaries of access. Pursuant to long-set-
tled policy in the disposition of constitutional questions, courts should refrain
from deciding issues presented in a highly abstract form, especially in instances
where the Supreme Court has not articulated guiding standards. . . . Since the
principles at stake are important and require a delicate balancing, prudence
dictates that we leave the definition of the exact parameters of press access to
military operations abroad for a later date when a full record is available, in the
unfortunate event that there is another military operation. Accordingly, the
Court declines to exercise its power to grant plaintiffs' request for declaratory
relief on their right of access claim." (quoting Nation Magazine v. Dep't of
Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Rescue Army v. Munic-
ipal Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 575-85 (1947)))).
237. Id. at 110.
238. Id.
239. 762 F. Supp. at 1572.
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Nation Magazine court discussed the different approaches and
conflicting results in Supreme Court access cases.
In addition, analysis of these cases indicates that confusion
over the existence of the right to know is also the product of the
judiciary's reluctance to intrude into an area where it does not
have expertise or concludes it would be intruding on the consti-
tutional authority of another branch of government. The
national security cases clearly demonstrate the judiciary's
extreme reluctance to become involved in another branch of
government's affairs. Although courts considering access to
national security locations or information have engaged in dis-
cussions of a First Amendment right of access, ultimately, most of
the courts focused on other issues that allowed them to avoid
deciding the cases based on a right of access. While some of the
cases specifically presented the issues in terms of justiciability,
mootness or the political question doctrine, others engaged in
discussions of the need to balance the powers of the separate
branches of government or decided the facts of the case were not
developed enough to intercede on behalf of the press.
The importance of the courts' concern with their own power
and role is highlighted by the fact that in the national security
access cases discussions about separation of powers often over-
shadowed discussion of balancing government transparency with
national security or the benefits transparency brings to the demo-
cratic process. Only three of the national security access opin-
ions-the majority opinion as well as Justice White's dissent in
Egan, and Nation Magazine-specifically presented the cases as
dealing with the need to balance national security with the First
Amendment and transparency concerns and decided the cases
by focusing on the issue.2 1' The Nation Magazine court was par-
ticularly clear that the case was about balancing the two issues.
Although Sherill,2" Getty Images,2 4 3 and Flynt2" all discussed bal-
ancing transparency with another factor, the opinions relied on
practical case specific considerations to reach their decisions and
refused to break new constitutional ground on amorphous or
shifting facts. No lower court was willing to advance a right of
access based on abstract issues and hypothetical situations.
Although they have been willing to consider extending a consti-
240. Id.
241. See Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1988); id. at 534-38
(White, J., dissenting); Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1571.
242. Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F. 2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
243. Getty Images News Services Co. v. Dep't of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112
(D.D.C. 2002).
244. Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003).
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tutional right of access well beyond the courtroom, they have not
seen fit to actually rule on whether such a right exists, instead
focusing on other issues and waiting for the Supreme Court to
clarify how far access extends.
While this approach was particularly evident in the lower
court national security cases, it was also present in at least one
Supreme Court case, Warner Communications,211 in which the
Court decided the question presented would best be answered
outside of the judiciary. As noted, instead of confronting the
executive or legislative branches, the Court declined to rule on
the existence of a right of access, and instead held that the Presi-
dential Recordings Act would ultimately control the release of
the records.24 6 In an argument that was very similar to the
national security access cases, Justice Powell's majority opinion
simply stated that the courts were not well equipped to handle
the details of access to presidential records24 7 and failed to
address major access issues raised by the case.
Thus, when confronted with another branch of government,
although many courts engaged in detailed discussions of the ben-
efits of a First Amendment right of access, ultimately most courts
found other ways to reach a conclusion. Although a few courts
have voiced concerns or put restraints on the executive branch's
ability to control national security information, 248 the general
trend has been for courts to rule that they are not qualified to
consider the cases dealing with national security.249
There are a number of explanations for courts' desire to not
decide these cases. First, it is possible that this emphasis is
related to legitimate constitutional questions and concerns. Sev-
eral of the cases discussed above focused on which branch of gov-
ernment was given the power to control national security
information by the Constitution or focused on the Framers'
intent to determine who should have the power. For example, in
245. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
246. Id. at 603.
247. Id. at 606.
248. See Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 534 (1988) (White, J., dis-
senting); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
249. See, e.g., Hall v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Admin. Review Bd., 476 F.3d
847 (10th Cir. 2007); Bennett v. Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hill v.
White, 321 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003); Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348 (4th Cir.
1999); Makky v. Chertoff, 489 F. Supp. 2d 421 (D.N.J. 2007); Nickelson v.
United States, 284 F. Supp. 2d 387 (E.D. Va. 2003); Cobb v. Danzig, 190 F.R.D.
564 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Edwards v. Widnall, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Minn. 1998);
Stehney v. Perry, 907 F. Supp. 806 (D.N.J. 1995). But see Ranger v. Tenet, 274 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003).
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Egan, Blackmun wrote that the authority to protect national
security information flowed directly from the Constitution and
fell on the President "as head of the Executive Branch and as
Commander in Chief."250 Second, it could be related to practical
concerns with the ability and/or expertise of the courts to deal
with national security information. Several courts have stated
their concerns with the judiciary's inability to know what infor-
mation might be dangerous to national security or the inability
of courts to properly control and house national security
information.
Finally, it is possible that it is related to inter-institutional
constraints placed on the judiciary. Scholars who advance the
"strategic account" of judicial decision-making have argued that
judges are strategic actors who must consider the preferences of
other actors and institutions and the institutional and historical
context in which they act.252 The judiciary is but one part of our
governmental structure that must take into account the desires
and powers of the other branches of government. While the
Constitution set out the powers of each branch, scholars have
noted that this was only the beginning of a long process by which
political institutions take shape.25 ' Rather than being static, the
powers of our political institutions are defined through
"sequences of events . . . either unanticipated by the framers or
unspecified in the [Constitution] ."254 Under this analysis, it is
clear that in national security access cases, the courts are being
mindful of the desires and powers of other political institutions.
Because they deal with the powers of the other branches of
government, the national security access opinions become espe-
cially important to consider when discussing access to terrorism
trials. In the judicial access cases, concerns with intruding upon
another branch of government were, of course, not present.
Because the justices were in effect creating rules for their own
house, the Court had leeway to rely upon structural and func-
tional arguments to create a system of access and dissemination
without worrying about overextending their power. After the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, however, the U.S. govern-
ment has claimed a need to conduct numerous judicial proceed-
ings in secret, based on national security concerns. Therefore,
because these cases will combine judicial access and national
250. Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
251. See, e.g., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369-70 (4th
Cir. 1975).
252. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 42, at 10-18.
253. Knight & Epstein, supra note 42, at 88.
254. Id.
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security access cases, it is helpful to analyze access to terrorism
trials under the conceptual framework offered by social architec-
ture theory in order to ensure the values and architecture
advanced by the judicial access cases continue to be reinforced,
even when dealing with national security information.
As Daniel Solove wrote, all law should be used to establish an
"architecture of power" that maintains the appropriate balance
of power in relationships.25" Discussing the need for social archi-
tecture in privacy law, Solove wrote that too often the law only
works at the surface of a problem, "dealing with the overt abuses
and injuries that may arise in specific instances. But thus far the
law does not do enough to redefine the underlying relationships
that cause these symptoms. "256 Similarly, although many of the
national security cases outlined above are clear examples of
judges discussing power relationships, they are too frequently
decided on issues related to specific circumstances of the cases
rather than on architecture.
When judges, politicians and other government officials
consider cases or public policy dealing with access to terrorism
trials, it is important to remember the nation's original social
architecture, as established by the Constitution and the First
Amendment. As noted in several cases discussed above, the
Framers of the Constitution were acutely aware of the dangers of
the accumulation of power in the same hands.2 57 For example,
referring to an architecture of power that went beyond a focus
on the individual complaint, the D.C. Circuit wrote in A 7725
that the Framers expected that when "conflicts in scope of
authority arose between the coordinate branches, a spirit of
dynamic compromise would promote resolution of the dispute in
the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective func-
tioning of our governmental system."259 The court further
admonished that "each branch should take cognizance of an
implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation
through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting
branches in the particular fact situation" in order to avoid "the
mischief of polarization. "260
255. Solove, supra note 19, at 1087.
256. DANIELJ. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 100 (2004).
257. See, e.g., THE FEDERALiST No. 47, at 239 (James Madison) (Lawrence
Goldman ed., 2008) (writing the accumulation of power "in the same hands ...
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny").
258. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
259. Id. at 127.
260. Id.
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In addition, when judges and policy makers move beyond
separation of powers concerns to focus on balancing national
security and transparency or, more fundamentally, the relation-
ship between the government, the press and the people, they can
still focus on architecture. It is important to remember the
Framers were heavily influenced by the writings ofJohn Locke, a
seventeenth century Enlightenment philosopher who proposed a
government based on the consent of the governed in his book
the Second Treatise of Government."' Locke was concerned with
what form a legitimate government should take and how to estab-
lish the conditions necessary for peace and security. Locke
focused on the restriction of state power to create private spheres
of civil liberty."' Locke's understanding of the social contract is
based on the pre-existing rights of the individual, which are
retained even when the individual enters into the collective. To
Locke, "because government existed solely based on the consent
of the governed, the government could not take away pre-
existing rights, such as the right to free expression."2 " Histori-
ans have argued that to Locke, a free and open press was the best
way to guarantee citizens' protection from government tyranny
that may impinge on these natural rights, 264 government should
be judged by the governed through the free exchange of
ideas,2" and citizens need as much information about their gov-
ernment as possible in order to function in a democracy.266 In
terms of social architecture theory, Locke "proposed a social
architecture in which power ultimately belonged to citizens, not
those who governed them."267
Therefore, judges and other policy makers must keep in
mind the balance of power between the branches and the archi-
tecture created by the First Amendment even when considering
cases under the backdrop of events like the terrorist attacks of
September 11. While it is true that in Lockean philosophy gov-
ernment's central purpose is to protect each individual's rights
against invasion and to protect "the entire society from having
the rights of its members robbed from them by another nation's
261. JOHN LociaF, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P.
Peardon, ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1975) (1690).
262. See, e.g., id. at 32 (writing "the end of law is not to abolish or restrain,
but to preserve and enlarge freedom").
263. Silver, supra note 33, at 172-73.
264. FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND
1476-1776, at 261 (1965).
265. DAVID A. COPELAND, THE IDEA OF A FREE PRESS 92 (2006).
266. Id. at 92-93.
267. Packer, supra note 32, at 401.
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war-launching invasion,"' 68 these two values must always coexist.
Advocating for an architecture of power that embraces these
notions goes beyond arguing that courts should recognize the
individual rights of the plaintiffs in access to terrorism trial cases.
It advocates decisions that empower both the courts and society
in a broad and meaningful way.
There are several ways for judges and policy makers to rein-
force the architecture established by the Constitution and First
Amendment, as well as uphold the structure created by the judi-
cial access cases, while also ensuring that national security infor-
mation is protected during trials involving terrorist suspects.
First, judges should be mindful of the Supreme Court's discus-
sion of the long history and benefits of access to court proceed-
ings and documents. Opening criminal trials to the public
contributes to fairness, reliability and trust in the judicial sys-
tem2 69 and a right of access is necessary to protect the free flow
of information about government in order to ensure the proper
functioning of a democratic society.270 In addition, open trials
have a "therapeutic value" for the community, 271 a value that is
especially important in terrorism cases given the effect of the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11 on the American public. Further-
more, by actively deciding when to grant access-as courts have
traditionally done in the judiciary cases-rather than deferring
to other branches of government-as courts have done in the
national security access cases-the judiciary will remain an inde-
pendent, co-equal branch of government.
Finally, an architecture of access is especially important in
cases dealing with terrorism trials because access to the judiciary
by the press serves an especially important function in these
cases. Because national security is important to every person in
the United States, yet trials involving terrorism are located geo-
graphically distant from so much of the population, providing
access to the press so that they may serve as "surrogates for the
public"272 is vital. As one scholar wrote:
Cases involving national security necessarily deal with
information that is of broad public interest to people
268. Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought:
The Presumption in Favor of Liberty Over Law and the Court Over the Constitution, 75
U. CIN. L. Rtv. 1499, 1507 (2007).
269. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
270. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-05
(1982).
271. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 570-71 (1980) (writing that open criminal tri-
als provide "an outlet for community concerns, hostility and emotion").
272. Id. at 572-73.
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outside of the geographic region in which the proceeding
is taking place. Thus, as the interest in the case increases,
the ability of interested individuals to monitor the proceed-
ings decreases. Thus, . . . access . . . serves an even more
important purpose and should be subject to an even more
rigorous analysis. 2 73
Additionally, it is important to note that the architecture of
presumptive access created by the Supreme Court is not without
limits. The Court has determined that although there is a First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, such a right can be
overcome by an overriding or compelling interest, so long as that
right is narrowly tailored, that is, as brief as possible to serve the
interest. In Press-Enterprise I, the Court wrote:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essen-
tial to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can
determine whether the closure order was properly
entered.2 7 1
While such an architecture would allow for the closing of terror-
ism trials in cases that truly warrant it for a narrow amount of
time when the court specifically articulates why the closure is nec-
essary, it would certainly not allow for the arbitrary closure of
courtrooms or the removal of an entire case from a public
docket.2 7 5
However, although this Article calls for the judiciary to take
a greater role in providing access to terrorism trials, it is impor-
tant to remember that constitutional doctrine provides only one
way in which constitutional principles-and thus social architec-
ture-can be advanced. As Professor Jack M. Balkin noted,
"Sometimes [First Amendment] values are best enforced ... by
legislatures, administrative agencies, and by courts interpreting
273. Michael P. Goodwin, A National Security Puzzle: Mosaic Theory and the
First Amendment Right of Access in the Federal Courts, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 179, 201 (2010).
274. Press-Enter. Co. v. Riverside County Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,
510 (1984).
275. See, e.g., M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004). After September
11, Mohamed Kamel Bellaouel, an Algerian man married to a U.S. citizen, was
detained in Miami, Florida, for overstaying his student visa. Bellaouel was held
for five months, during which time he was transferred to Virginia to testify at
the trial of September 11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui. See Meliah Thomas,
The First Amendment Right of Access to Docket Sheets, 94 CAIIF. L. REv. 1537 (2006),
for a more detailed discussion of the case.
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statutes and regulations."2 76 Statutory law-such as the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 277-can also work to rein-
force a social architecture of access and accountability. Because
CIPA, which governs the use of classified information when such
information is used in federal prosecutions, allows judges the
ability to control national security information, court closures
and blocking access to trial is not needed. When classified infor-
mation must be used in a criminal proceeding, CIPA provides for
in camera review by the presiding judge to determine if the infor-
mation is relevant to the proceeding2 7 8 and gives the judge tools
for dealing with the classified information. For example, the
judge may order the government to delete certain portions of
the information, present an unclassified summary of the informa-
tion, or summarize what the classified information might tend to
prove.279
While the statute itself has no bearing on public access, it
does provide the judiciary with a valuable tool that might allevi-
ate concerns that the judiciary is not properly equipped to deal
with national security information. This in turn allows the courts
to maintain the appropriate balance of powers with the other
branches of government-an important goal of social architec-
ture-without having to worry about dangers to national security.
Together, the ability to close trials for a specific, narrowly tai-
lored reason and CIPA, ensure national security information is
safe during terrorism trials. A 2008 study of terrorism prosecu-
tions based on publicly available information concluded that no
security breach has occurred during a terrorism trial because of a
court's failure to close a docket or judicial proceeding and there
is no evidence of a leak in a case in which CIPA has been
invoked.2 so
Additionally, public policy-such as the Pentagon's new
guidelines for reporters covering the detention and trials of ter-
rorism suspects at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba-should embrace the
276. Balkin, supra note 30, at 941.
277. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006).
278. Id. § 6(a), (d).
279. Id. § 4.
280. SeeJAMESJ. BENJAMINJR. & RICHARD P. ZABEiL, HUMAN FJGHTS FIRST,
IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS 88
(2008), http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.
pdf. While it is possible that classified information might be able to prove oth-
erwise, this provides another example of why transparency can benefit the gov-
ernment. If there are examples of how the mishandling of national security
information by the judiciary has led to breaches of national security, this infor-
mation does nothing to inform the debate of access to terrorism trials if this
information itself is classified and unavailable to the public.
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notion that the press is a vital component of the democratic pro-
cess. As noted, in September 2010, in response to complaints
from media organizations, the DOD created new "Media Ground
Rules" for Guantdnamo Bay. In addition to other provisions, the
ground rules narrowed the definition of "protected informa-
tion,"281 stated journalists would not be in violation of the rules
for republishing protected information where that information
was "legitimately obtained" in the course of independent new-
sgathering" 2 and stated the "Defense Department [would] facili-
tate media access to military commissions to the maximum
extent possible, in an effort to encourage open reporting and
promote transparency."2 11 While there were still a number of
issues to be worked out, media organizations expressed the belief
that the new guidelines were a good faith effort to "address the
problems that have prevented reporting from Guantanamo to be
as complete and accurate as it ought to be."284
In sum, by focusing on architecture in judicial decisions,
statutory law and public policy, the government can ensure an
architecture of power that promotes core democratic values and
the proper sharing of both power and information. While being
mindful of the appropriate balance of power is important in all
cases dealing with national security, it is especially important in
cases dealing with access to national security information. As
Professor Cathy Packer wrote, disputes about access to informa-
tion are about "the fundamental relationship among the govern-
ment, the media and the public" because "[i] nformation is
power, and the proper sharing of this power source is critical to
the proper operation of a democratic government."2 8 1
281. GUANTANAMO MIDIA GROUND Rurits, supra note 18, at 4. Protected
information includes classified information, information "which could reasona-
bly be expected to cause damage to national security," and information "subject
to a properly-issued protective order." Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 6.
284. Lane, supra note 18, at 1 (quoting comments from John Walcott, the
Washington bureau chief of McClatchy, the third largest newspaper company in
the United States).
285. Packer, supra note 31, at 32-33.
